In an O.T.C. market like the one for corporate bonds in the US, dealer intermediation is essential to execute a trade. Moreover, the incentives of the dealers and those of their customers are likely to be non-aligned. This paper analyzes the nature of dealer-customer relationship and investigates how adverse selection leads to agency issues. Results show that dealers set the execution price to shift the risk of informed trading to their clients. Shortages of funding liquidity exacerbate this behavior. During the great financial crisis, dealers "leaned their clients against the wind" without compensating them for liquidity provision. Despite the increasing transparency brought by electronic trading, these agency issues are likely to remain present on the speculative segment of the market, where adverse selection is the most harmful to traders. This paper proposes policy measures to overcome these agency issues.
Introduction
The US corporate bond market is an Over-The-Counter market where virtually all transactions are executed through dealers. Given their centrality, they act as price maker agents and can conduct price discrimination (Bessembinder and Maxwell, 2008) . Dealers can set the price according to their inventory rebalancing needs (Randall, 2015) , or as a function of the bargaining power of their counterparty (Duffie et al., 2005) . As a consequence, we observe different prices for the same security at the same moment (Feldhütter, 2012) .
The liquidity provision in this market is also influenced by the need for immediacy of the trade initiators. Customers demand immediacy when they are informed (Gehrig, 1993) ; however, dealers prefer to withdraw from the market and act as a broker while facing an informed investor (Grossman and Miller, 1988) . The incentives of dealers and customers are clearly non-aligned, and this may originate agency issues in the presence of adverse selection.
This paper contributes to the literature on dealership markets with an empirical investigation on the dealers' response to adverse selection. My analysis focuses on the different prices of the same security observed in a given day, and relates them to several proxies of the information content of the trade. The main data source of this study is the enhanced version of the TRACE dataset, which contains more information about the trade initiator and the uncensored trade size. The time horizon goes from 2004 to 2012.
The first research question I address is whether dealers are willing to provide immediacy in presence of adverse selection. Following Gehrig, (1993) and Bank for International Settlements, (2014), I assume that proprietary trades are more likely to be information-driven than intermediated trades, which are more often motivated by liquidity. This assumption is plausible since the ex-post returns of proprietary trades are higher and less variable than those of intermediated trades. Therefore, my first proxy for the information content is the capacity of the initiator: the dataset reports whether the initiator of the trade is acting on his own behalf (Principal) or is intermediating a trade (Agency). As an alternative proxy for the information content, I use the order flow toxicity metric proposed by Easley, López de Prado, et al., (2012) . I then relate the transaction price to these proxies of information content and to the inventory used by dealers to execute the trade.
Results show that dealers offer a better price to absorb the trade on their inventory when facing an uninformed trader. Instead, they offer a better price to informed traders when they can shift the trade to their clients' inventory via an agency or a pre-arranged trade. This reveals an agency issue: dealers shift the adverse selection on the clients who are entrusting their orders.
The second research question regards the effect of funding illiquidity. The predictions of the literature are mixed in this respect: on the one hand, dealers are financially constrained and cannot supply liquidity (O'Hara and Oldfield, 1986) ; on the other, it is profitable to provide liquidity because of firesales (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009 ). I proxy the funding illiquidity with the Libor-OIS spread as in Brunnermeier, (2009) .
We observe from the results that dealers provide less liquidity when they face funding shortages. However, the liquidity deterioration varies with the information content of the trade: when facing a proprietary trader, dealers increase the price for providing liquidity with their own inventory, while they do it to a lower extent when they can shift the order to their clients. The opposite happens when the trade is intermediated. We can conclude that funding illiquidity exacerbates the agency issue described above.
The third question I address is about the liquidity provision during the great financial crisis. To investigate this issue, I perform the analysis on a subsample starting from the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Results reveal a change in the dealers' behavior: the liquidity provision originating from their own inventories is the most expensive regardless of the trade initiator. During the great financial crisis, dealers "leaned their clients against the wind" by exploiting their inventories and providing them a low compensation for liquidity provision.
The conclusions drawn from this analysis have implications for the proper functioning of such an important market. Regulations such as Basel III and the Volcker rule are transforming the corporate bond market into an agency market, where customers are becoming more and more the actual liquidity providers. Nevertheless, dealers remain the only players who can receive an adequate compensation for liquidity. External providers receive a lower premium and are more subject to adverse selection. We can conclude that policy measures ensuring pro-tection for liquidity provision are necessary in this market.
This paper proceeds as follows: section 2 provides a review of related literature, section 3 summarizes the most important features of U.S. corporate bond market, section 4 describes the details of the empirical analysis, section 5 discusses the results, section 6 suggests some policy measures to overcome these agency issues, and finally, section 7 contains concluding remarks.
Literature review
The determinants of price discrepancies in OTC markets have been studied for several years. Earlier papers in this field attribute the causes of price dispersion to information and liquidity.
The seminal work of Warga, (1991) compares NYSE Automated Bond System (A.B.S.) transaction prices (transparent trades) with Lehman Brothers bid quotes (opaque dealer trades). He finds that high duration, low credit rating, small issue amount, and low trading volume increase price dispersion. Hong and Warga, (2000) use NYSE A.B.S. data and institutional trades data from the Capital Access International (C.A.I.) database to construct an effective transaction based bid-ask spread. They find that spreads observed on the OTC market are larger than those observed on the exchange.
Price dispersion is also a manifestation of a segmented market: in the interdealer market, we can observe lower "wholesale" prices; instead, the customerto-dealer market is resembling a retail market where dealers can charge the compensation for market making. Round-trip transaction costs measure the difference between prices of interdealer and customer trades.
Schultz, (2001) uses C.A.I. data to quantify the impact of the trade size and the presence of dealers in the market. He finds that trading costs (as measured as the cost of a round-trip transaction) are decreasing in trade size. In addition, if the trade is executed through a large dealer, costs are halved compared to a small dealer. This difference is imputable to the fact that obtaining information is expensive and only large institution can bear these costs.
In an O.T.C. market, prices are determined by a bargaining process. Duffie et al., (2005) provide an extensive analysis of search and bargaining cost in O.T.C. markets: in their model trading costs are lower when there is less need for immediacy and when the market maker has less bargaining power. Green et al., (2007a,b) use muni bond transaction data to show that price dispersion is linked to market power of dealers and bargaining power of large customers. Large trades are executed with a lower markup even though the risk of losses is larger. Feldhütter, (2012) finds lower trading cost (as measured as round-trip transaction cost) for large trades in presence of sale pressure. He attributes the cause to higher bargaining power of large players.
Several papers spurred from the mandatory transaction reporting through TRACE Many of them analyze the impact of the increased transparency on trading costs. Edwards et al., (2007) and Goldstein et al., (2007) analyze trading costs before and after the introduction of TRACE. Not surprisingly, they find lower transaction cost after the availability of more price information. The increased post-trade transparency diffused by TRACE caused lower trading cost not only for securities eligible for reporting but also for non-eligible securities (Bessembinder, Maxwell, and Venkataraman, 2006) .
Traders bear the costs of trading in an opaque market to avoid the diffusion of information. Hendershott and Madhavan, (2015) argue that for active and liquid securities, an electronic auction market is more suitable than bilateral negotiation. In fact, information is already present in the market and risk of leakage is lower. In presence of asymmetrically informed agents, dealers can facilitate trading by layering information asymmetries over sequential transactions (Glode and Opp, 2014) .
Dealers' inventory risk is likely to determine the price they offer in different transactions of the same security. Amihud and Mendelson, (1980) analyze how dealers set the price of a transaction: when computing inventory costs, dealers incorporate losses due to adverse selection as a part of them. O'Hara and Oldfield, (1986) argue that in presence of uncertainty about future market orders, inventory risk is large. Therefore, risk averse dealers are likely to provide better quotes than a risk neutral one in order to reduce their inventory and minimize variability of their profits. Comerton-Forde et al., (2010) report wider bid-ask spread in the equity market after market makers lose money on their inventories and/or find themselves holding large positions. Dick-Nielsen and Rossi, (2016) shows that dealers offer worse condition when they face possible inventory shocks like absorption of securities excluded from an index. In the recent years, dealers' inventory management must comply with increasing regulatory requirements in terms of capital adequacy. Due to capital constraints, dealers must ensure that the pricing of transactions reflects the internal costs of allocating capital and providing the desired return on equity (Bank for International Settlements, 2014) .
Dealers are likely to form networks to reduce their trading costs and better offset excess inventory (Gale and Kariv, 2007) . The position of a dealer in the network determines trading costs. Central dealers offer immediacy by holding securities in their inventory; however, this comes at higher cost compared to peripheral dealers (Li and Schürhoff, 2014) . The relational structure of dealers network is explored empirically by Di Maggio et al., (2016) : they find that price conditions are advantageous to dealers having stronger trading relationships with their counterparty rather than peripheral dealers or customers.
3 Features of the U.S. corporate bond market 3.1 Stylized facts about the market structure Between 25 and 30 billions of dollar of corporate bond par value are traded OTC each day in the US 1 . In the corporate bond market, most of the trades are either inter-dealer or customer to dealer. Customer to customer transactions rarely occur (Randall, 2015) . Trades are typically large in volume and institutional investors are the main players of this market (Piwowar, 2011) . Transactions can be proprietary or agency: in the former case both counterparties bear the inventory risk, while in the latter the security does not transit through the balance sheet of the institution executing the trade. Dealers executing a proprietary trade charge a spread as remuneration for liquidity provision, while the compensation for intermediation is charged in form of a commission. In addition to these two categories of trades, we can observe pre-arranged trades: i.e. there are a buy and a sell trade of the same size occurring within a short time horizon. These trades are registered as principal trades even though the inventory risk is virtually null. The compensa-tion for a dealer executing a pre-arranged trade is the difference between the price of the two legs of the transaction, which is a considerable fraction of the costs for trading corporate bonds (Harris, 2015) . The corporate bond market in the US has a core-periphery structure (figure 1). Every trade is executed by dealers, who represent the core of the market. As mentioned above, dealers' customers do not trade between each other and represent a two levels periphery: a closer one where customers are likely to be informed and an extreme periphery where they are uninformed 2 . Since informed customers are likely to trade directly with dealers, while the uninformed are likely to trade through an intermediary (Bank for International Settlements, 2014; Gehrig, 1993) , in the remainder of the paper I am going to refer to the former (proprietary trades) with the term insiders, and to the latter (agency trades) with the term outsiders. In this market, large orders are less likely to cause a liquidity shock than in a limit order book market. The reason lies in the large balance sheet of dealers, which can absorb such orders with limited price impact. Information percolation is also reduced because of the bilateral nature of agreements. Therefore, an opaque market is better suited to accommodate the needs of sophisticated and possibly informed investors than an exchange (Biais and Green, 2007) .
There is almost no pre-trade transparency in corporate bond trading: dealers are not required to disseminate binding quotes on a regular basis (BlackRock, 2014) . Quotes are still requested by phone and are valid "as long as the breath is warm". Therefore, the ability of a market participant to "shop around" for quotes is limited (Bessembinder and Maxwell, 2008) . This lack of transparency is disadvantageous for retail traders that are at the margin of this market.
Despite the rise of electronic trading venues, dealers continue to play a central role. Corporate bonds are highly heterogeneous and trade at low frequency, therefore a regulated electronic exchange is less likely to prevail in this market (Bank for International Settlements, 2016) . Most of the electronic transactions are trades with notional value below 1 million, typically retail trades occurring in platforms such as NYSE A.B.S. Large trades on electronic platforms are more common in the interdealer markets (Mizrach, 2015) . In summary, dealers benefit the most from the introduction of electronic trading; moreover, they still preserve the advantage of their core position in the market in terms of price making (Harris, 2015) .
Starting from July 2002, the National Association of Security Dealers (NASD) introduced a program to partially improve transparency in this market. All members of the NASD are required to report price, quantity, and trade conditions for secondary market transaction involving investment grade bonds having more than one billion of dollars outstanding. Reported information is then disseminated through the Trade Reporting And Compliance Engine (TRACE). Transparency has since progressively increased: starting from October 2004, practically all secondary market transaction are reported and since 2008 the side of the trade (buy or sell initiated) is diffused. The dissemination of information through TRACE brought post-trade transparency to this market.
Despite the effort to bring transparency to the market, dealers continue to make price discrimination. To gauge the magnitude of this phenomenon, I compute a measure of price deviation: for each bond with at least 5 trades in a given day, I compute the difference between the executed price and the average daily price of that bond. I compute the price deviation δ for each trade j in day t of bond i as
Where P is the price of the security and N is the number of trades. Since the corporate bond market is characterized by slow-moving capital, it is reasonable to assume that information is not incorporated into prices at a sub-daily frequency and that price difference between trades is idiosyncratic. This measure of price deviation allows to have an approximation of the relative markup (markdown) that dealers charge when they sell (buy) also for securities without an active interdealer market, as the benchmark price is the daily mean of all transactions. Table 1 reports the mean and the standard deviation of the price deviation distinguishing for trade side, trade size class, and for the capacity (principal or agent) of the trade initiator. These summary statistics suggest that trading costs are decreasing in size (in accordance with other studies), but dealers are providing worse quotes when absorbing a large proprietary sale compared to an agency one. The less favorable price may incorporate an adverse selection component (as described in Glosten and Milgrom, 1985) , or a compensation for immediacy. However, the pattern of average prices is different for buyer-initiated trades, where proprietary trades have lower execution costs. The lower price for liquidity may highlight the tendency of dealers to keep smaller inventories and their willingness to offer better condition to investors initiating a buy trade.
To have an idea of the type of trades executed in the market, figures 2 and 3 plot monthly time series of the number and volume of trades, respectively. The majority of trades for all trade size classes are proprietary trades initiated by customers 3 . Agency trades occur less often and are mostly executed through a dealer.
To have a breakdown on the capacity of the executing dealers, Recently, regulations such as the Volcker rule and Basel III prohibited banks' proprietary trading and imposed capital requirements on inventories. Therefore, the U.S. corporate bond market is in a phase of transition from being a "principal market" (where dealers assume inventory risk) to an agency market (where dealers act as intermediaries). This transition will lead to an increasing number of agency and pre-arranged transactions.
Incentive compatibility among players
Given the unregulated nature of the market described above, and the heterogeneity between core and periphery players, a misalignment between the incentives of dealers and those of their customers is likely present.
Dealers provide the service of immediacy when they engage in proprietary transactions (Demsetz, 1968) , they facilitate trades between two heterogeneously informed parties (Merton, 1995) , and they are active in information production because of their centrality in the market (Campbel and Krakaw, 1980) . In performing such activities, dealers are not subject to regulatory constraints, hence their behavior is solely determined by a maximization of their payoffs compatible with the risks they face. Among such risks, we can identify those stemming from the uncertainty about asset returns and transaction arrival (Ho and Stoll, 1981) . In addition to these sources of risk, dealers have to react to adverse selection as well (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985) , one way to do so is to refrain from providing immediacy and act as broker (Grossman and Miller, 1988) .
On the other hand customers are quite heterogeneous in their incentives: a retail trader is more concerned about the best price, a sophisticated trader may care more about immediacy, while a large buy-and-hold investor will aim for the lowest price per amount traded (Sensebrenner, 2013) . Nevertheless, customers behave similarly when taking information into account: buyers or sellers expecting large gains from trading (informed agents) prefer to trade directly with a dealer, while the others prefer to engage in the search for counterparties or to mandate such search to a broker (Gehrig, 1993) . To test this claim, one would need a regular time series of prices to compute the ex-post return. In the infrequent trading setting of the corporate bond market this is not always possible. Hence, the comparison of ex-post returns only gauges the information content of trading in the most liquid securities. Table 3 reports the comparison of the ex-post returns of proprietary and intermediated trades computed 1, 7, and 30 days ahead. We can notice that proprietary trades have a higher average ex-post return, and a lower variance compared to intermediated trades. This higher profitability of proprietary trades supports the hypothesis that traders demanding immediacy have a more precise signal.
Since informed players will demand immediacy more, the executing dealer can assess the risk of adverse selection. As a response to informed traders, dealers can either provide worse quotes, or shift this transaction to clients' inventory via an agency trade or by arranging an opposite trade with another client. Being price makers, dealers can offer trade conditions to make their preferred way of transacting appealing to the trade initiator. In this way, if a customer is the actual liquidity supplier, he is not adequately compensated and he might be the recipient of an informed trade.
Empirical analysis 4.1 Data sources
The main data source of this study is the audit trail of corporate bond transaction disseminated through the Trade Reporting And Compliance Engine (TRACE) dataset. WRDS provides an enhanced version containing information about the initiator of each trade executed since the inception of the dataset, in addition the volume of large trades is uncensored. The time horizon of this dataset starts on July 1 To find information about the securities traded (e.g. amount issued, price at issue and rating), I rely on Thomson Reuters. The same source provides data about interest rates (Libor and Overnight Indexed Swap) that I use to compute proxies for funding liquidity.
Empirical modelling
The analysis is based on multiple linear regressions of the price deviation. This variable is defined as the difference between the price at which each transaction of a given security occurs and the average daily price of the same security (See section 3 and table 13 for details on how this variable is computed).
On the subset of customer-to-dealer trades, I estimate a separate model for each initiating side of the trade and for its capacity (e.g. buyer-initiated as princi-pal or seller-initiated as agent). The general specification is
The dependent variable δ is the price deviation measure of each trade j in day t of bond i as defined in equation 1.
The Capacity vector is structured as (1, Principal, Pre-arranged) : the Principal dummy is equal to 1 if the trade is executed using the dealer's inventory, while the Pre-arranged dummy is equal to one if the trade is a riskless principal. The capacity of a dealer as principal or agent is reported in the dataset, while a pre-arranged trade is identified when a buy and a sell trades of the same security, with the same trade volume occur within a 15 minutes time frame. Volume is the reported dollar volume of the trade. Libor-OIS is the spread between the two interbank rates and serves as a proxy for funding liquidity. The dummy on-the-run is equal to 1 if a bond has been issued in the previous 90 days, and distinguishes the securities that are traded more actively (Mizrach, 2015) . Mkt Liquidity is either the total volume or the total number of trades in all corporate bond in a given day. The coefficients β . are conformable vectors for the matrix multiplication (denoted with ·).
This simple specification for the trading costs distinguishes between possibly uninformed (intermediated) and possibly informed (proprietary) trades. In addition, I run a robustness check by including the measure of order flow toxicity (VPIN) proposed by Easley, López de Prado, et al., (2012) to gauge the impact of a different measure of informed trading 4 . The specification with this toxicity variable is
4 Details about the construction of this measure are given in appendix B.
Even though this measure has been developed for high frequency markets, the underlying idea also holds for an illiquid one: once a given volume of trade is observed, the information content depends on how this volume is imbalanced. The only possible flaw in the corporate bond market is an overestimation of the information content, which might be contaminated by non-informative order imbalance. As an example, imagine a pension fund facing large inflows at the end of the fiscal period, the purchases of this fund will inflate the VPIN metric in an illiquid market. This overestimation of the information content only allows the interpretation of the related coefficient as a lower bound. The sample period for the regressions goes from October 1 st , 2004 to February 3 rd , 2012. After this date the reporting standards changed and the capacity of the trade initiator is no-longer available.
The regression equations described above allow to address several research questions. First, I analyze how dealers provide liquidity in presence of adverse selection. To do so, I construct a function that relates prices to the volume and the effective liquidity provider using the estimates of the vectors β 1 and β 2 . The comparison of such predicted prices allows to gauge how the compensation varies across liquidity providers in presence of adverse selection. To corroborate the results, I run the regressions with the toxicity measure and quantify the additional compensation with the estimates of the vector β 4 . Second, I address the impact of funding liquidity. The vector of coefficients β 3 measures the sensitivity of execution prices to the level of Libor-OIS spread. If this sensitivity is positive for sell initiated trades, dealers are capturing firesales; if it is negative, dealers are refusing to provide liquidity because of possible liquidity constraints. If the coefficients for buy initiated trades are negative, it means that dealers are striving to reduce their inventory.
Finally, I address the same questions for the period of the great financial crisis by running the same regressions on a sample starting on the day of Lehman brothers collapse. The interpretation of the coefficients is the same as above.
The initiator of interdealer trades cannot be evinced from the data because both parties are reporting the trade. Although these trades represent a relevant fraction of corporate bond transactions, I have to exclude them from the analysis because of this missing information.
5 Dealers' behavior in the corporate bond market 5.1 Adverse selection and trade execution price Dealers can execute a trade by using their own inventory or by matching incoming orders with those posted by their clients; that is, using de facto the clients' inventory. In the first case dealers bear all risks stemming from the execution, while in the second case such risks are shifted to the client posting the order. The compensation for dealers is the bid-ask spread when they trade as principal, and a commission when they trade on behalf of their clients. When dealers are prearranging trades, their compensation is the difference between the purchase and the sale price.
Dealers executing the trade offer different conditions depending on both the customer capacity and the inventory they use for the execution. To have a succinct overview of the difference in executed price, I compute the predicted markup (markdown) as a function of the capacity of the parties entering the trade and the quantity traded. According to the notation of equation 2, I compute the predicted values as δ = β 1 · Capacity + β 2 · Capacity * log(Volume)
I use the estimates of the betas reported in column (1) of tables 4, 5, 6, and 7. These estimates capture the relation between price deviation and trade size after controlling for market and funding liquidity. Finally, I compute three pricevolume curves using appropriate Capacity vectors to denote an agency, a principal, and a pre-arranged trade. Figure 4 shows the predicted trading costs offered to outsiders. As discussed in section 3.2, an informed trader is likely to demand immediacy for his trade, and therefore trade directly with the dealer. On the other hand, executing the trade through an intermediary is a signal of low information. An informed agent is unlikely to disguise by trading through an intermediary: first, the speed of transaction is lower and the information may become stale; second, the intermediary controls the terms of the trade, and this may erodes part of the profit of the initiating trader.
When trading as principal, a dealer offers a better trade conditions when pur-chasing from outsiders: he is willing to give up about 20 bps in order to increase his chances to complete the transaction and load the inventory with a lower risk of adverse selection. This relatively safe inventory is likely to be employed on the more lucrative business of immediacy provision. Looking at buyer-initiated trades, we can only notice a negligible difference of 5 bps. Hence, we can conclude that dealers do not charge different markups depending on the inventory. Figure 5 gives the equivalent overview for proprietary trades. These trades are not only more likely to be informed, but also the initiator has higher bargaining power. As a consequence, dealers executing these trades not only face a higher degree of adverse selection, but are also impeded to require an adequate compensation. When facing insiders, dealers are uneager to purchase using their own inventory and they impose a low execution price. When the trade is executed with clients' inventory, dealers offer instead better conditions. This behavior allows them to pocket the commission from the execution of a transaction, in addition they are also shifting the risk of adverse selection to their clients. Instead, when dealers cannot shift an order to a client, they make price concessions of about 10 bps to pre-arrange a trade, even though it decreases their profit margin. This behavior does not hold for small trades, which usually have a lower information content; hence, dealers prefer to trade using their own inventory.
When dealers are selling to a proprietary trader, their capacity matters less: the markup required to an insider for a transaction is the same whatever the inventory used. Dealers are likely to aim to a smaller inventory in order to reduce the capital charge of their investments. Therefore, they are not refraining from selling securities, even to possibly informed investors. Again, when the trade is pre-arranged, the sale execution price is higher to maximize the markup profit.
To have a better understanding on how dealers react to adverse selection, I compute the same regressions with the addition of the VPIN order flow toxicity metric. Columns (3) and (4) of tables 4, 5, 6, and 7 report the estimates for this specification of the model.
In the presence of buy order flow toxicity (positive VPIN metric), dealers adjust the markup to increase the compensation for the possibility of adverse selection. Coherently with the interpretation provided above, we observe a different effect depending on the information content of the trade: when trading with an outsider, dealers offer worse conditions in presence of high toxicity regardless of the final recipient of the trade; instead, when trading with an informed insider, dealers require a higher markup when trading their own inventory compared to the one required for a pre-arranged trade.
In presence of sell toxicity (negative VPIN metric), dealers react by reducing the execution price. Again, this adjustment depends on the capacity of both the initiator and the dealer. When the trade is initiated by an outsider dealers prefer to use their own inventory and require a lower compensation for the toxicity, this behavior is reversed when the trade is initiated by an insider.
One can argue that the capacity of the trade initiator and size are related and that the latter is driving the results. To address this issue, I compute the estimates including an interaction term between size classes (as defined in table 1), quantity traded and capacity of the dealer. These additional terms do not bring any additional explanatory power and we can conclude that the capacity, hence the risk of informed trading is determining different price conditions.
In summary, when a client is de facto supplying liquidity to the market, he is likely to be exposed to adverse selection instead of getting a compensation for liquidity provision. In addition, when dealers pre-arrange trades, they decrease the speed of trading which might be essential for informed traders. Lastly, large traders of bonds with lower need for immediacy (like pension funds and insurance companies) may get a better price for the volume they trade by trading on the passive side of the market. However, this strategy expose them to a higher risk of adverse selection since the control over the terms of trade would be entrusted to the dealer.
The impact of funding liquidity
Liquidity constraints obviously play a role in the pricing of securities. Traders facing liquidity issues are pushed to sell their position at lower prices (Coval and Stafford, 2007) . Funding liquidity influences trading activity of dealers as well. In fact, market making consists of building inventory of securities and selling liabilities (O'Hara and Oldfield, 1986) . Hence, increased cost of funding may cause dealers to withdraw from the market, with the effect of decreasing market liquidity and possibility of market breakdown (Gale and Kariv, 2007) . On the other hand, the higher presence of liquidity-based trades increase incentives to stand on the passive side of the market to capture firesales.
To proxy for funding liquidity, I take the spread between the Libor rate and the Overnight Indexed Swap rate. As documented in Brunnermeier, (2009) , this spread is a proxy for funding liquidity because it measures the premium demanded for the concession of an unsecured loan.
Results show that liquidity provision decreases when funding liquidity is scarce. Table 4 shows that the markup required to execute an agency trade is increasing in the Libor-OIS spread. When funding liquidity is scarce, a dealer is in advantage for two reasons: first, outsiders are likely to have low bargaining power; second, the competition with other dealers is reduced because inventories are likely smaller. As a result, dealers charge a higher price to sell securities to outsiders and to squeeze an even higher markup when trades are pre-arranged. Table 5 reports equivalent results for principal buyer initiated trades. When dealers face shortages of funding liquidity, they increase the markup of about 7 bps per percentage point of Libor-OIS spread, well below the 22 bps charged when trading clients' inventory. Dealers are likely to offer a better price for their own inventory for two main reasons: they are keen to sell large quantities of securities and the bargaining power of an insider is higher. The markup is also lower when considering riskless principal trades: in this case dealers give up part of their markup in order to facilitate the trade-through and avoid the inventory risk. Tables 6 and 7 report results for seller initiated trades. In presence of funding illiquidity, the behavior of the dealers depends on the capacity of the initiator: when trading with outsiders, dealers offer a better price when loading their own inventory; instead, when facing a possibly informed trader, dealers quote a better price for agency and pre-arranged trades, while lowering it when trading on their own account. Comparing trades in which the dealer has different capacity shows that dealers make price concessions to capture a possible firesale when they trade on their own account. A trade initiated by an outsider is more likely to be triggered by liquidity issues: as documented in Duffie et al., (2007) , some dealers are "waiting on the sidelines" to purchase securities at a distressed price, hence they are willing to offer better quotes when trading for themselves. When the sale is initiated by an insider, dealers tend to transfer the security to their clients by offering a higher price. In summary, the scarcity of funding liquidity exacerbates the agency issue described above.
The antithetic behavior we observe on the buy and sell side of trades when funding liquidity is low may appear hard to reconcile. A possible reason is the presence of different types of dealers, that are likely to behave differently when funding is scarce: dealers can be part of a very large firm (e.g. Barclays, Goldman) or they can be free-standing. The former can rely on both internal and external capital markets: hence, they are more robust to liquidity constraints and they can profit from firesales. The latter can only rely on external capital market: in presence of illiquidity they strive to unload their inventories. In addition, the relational nature of the dealership business may determine the favorable selling price offered by dealers: as argued in Di Maggio et al., (2016) , dealers offer better conditions to their most valuable clients in times of turmoil.
The great financial crisis
The great financial crisis has been a period characterized by extreme illiquidity, both in terms of market frictions and access to funding (Dick-Nielsen, Feldhütter, et al., 2012) . Among the event that occurred in that period, the default of a major corporate bond dealer had negative spillover effects on the liquidity provision by other dealers (Di Maggio et al., 2016) .
To investigate the impact of the great financial crisis on the behavior of dealers, I compute the same regressions on the subsample of trades occurring between September 15, 2008 (the day of Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy filing) and the end of the sample. Tables 8, 9 , 10, and 11 report the corresponding results for this subsample, while figures 6 and 7 summarize the predicted markup and markdowns using the results of the aforementioned analysis.
The behavior of the dealers changed during the great financial crisis. Dealers offer the best conditions when the ultimate liquidity provider is a client, hence they "lean their clients against the wind", while providing a smaller compensation for liquidity provision. Moreover, we see that dealers ask for a higher compensation while using their own inventory. The increase in markup occurs irrespectively of the capacity of the initiator. When considering pre-arranged trades, dealers no longer give up any of their mark-up profit. Hence, they are less interested in building safer inventories and more in getting adequate compensation for their liquidity provision and intermediation services.
In presence of order flow toxicity, dealers decrease liquidity supply in line with the behavior inferred from the full sample. However, they make slightly favorable conditions to pre-arrange trades and avoid inventory risk. It is worth noting that when facing a possibly informed seller, dealers require a higher liquidity compensation only when they use their own inventory.
Episodes of of funding illiquidity often manifested during the great financial crisis. During those episodes, dealers refrain to provide liquidity to the market by increasing trading costs when using their own inventory. When pre-arranging trades, dealers make some price concessions to avoid inventory risk. Finally, when facing a possibly uninformed seller, dealers offer a better quote in presence of funding illiquidity and this is compatible with their tendency of capturing firesales.
In summary, during the great financial crisis, dealers refrain from providing liquidity and are less interested in building inventories, even when the risk of adverse selection is low. They rather demand a higher compensation for liquidity provision in averse times, and set the prices to maximize their profitability. These results may also be determined by an anticipation of the incoming Volcker rule. In fact, the observed behavior is similar to the one reported by Bao et al., (2016) .
Policy recommendations
The results discussed in the previous section point out how the opaqueness of the corporate bond market allows dealers to conduct price discrimination and route orders to the inventory of their choice. Therefore, it is difficult to provide liquidity with an adequate compensation for adverse selection. In order to prevent dealers from shifting the risk of informed trading and improve market participation, we need to introduce policy measures allowing non-dealer participants to provide liquidity and to have control over the terms of trade.
One obvious measure would be the introduction of pre-trade transparency. This policy measure is discussed in Bloomfield and O'Hara, (1999) . Their exper-iment casts doubt on the welfare effects of market transparency: on the one hand it increases price efficiency, but on the other it increases trading costs. Moreover, both informed and uninformed traders are "losers" in a more transparent market setting. In the corporate bond market, the ex-ante knowledge of a tradable quote is putting both insiders and outsiders on the same level, hence dealers cannot shift the adverse selection. However, this kind of measure is likely to reduce liquidity since dealers are no longer able to discriminate between informed and uninformed traders, therefore they will rationally adjust their quotes. Pre-trade transparency will not be beneficial to the large players present in the market either, because they are losing their bargaining power. Additionally, this kind of transparency allows dealers to monitor each other's quote: in presence of a cartel between dealers, they would have a lower incentive to deviate from the collusive behavior.
A more viable approach is the extension to the bond market of two regulations which apply to equity trading. The first one is the order protection rule contained in the Regulation National Market System (Reg NMS): the limitation of trade-throughs would offer protection against the shift of adverse selection via pre-arranged trades, moreover it will eliminate the markup of riskless principal transactions, hence it will reduce trading costs. The second regulation which is likely to improve this market is the FINRA rule 5320 (Prohibition against trading ahead of customer orders): i.e. dealers must always execute clients' orders first, and use their own inventory only when these orders are satisfied. The introduction of this regulation will rule out the possibility for dealer to purchase safer inventory when customer orders are present. In this setting, dealers will only face reputational costs when they trade on behalf of their clients and the price of agency trades will reflect the adverse selection component. These regulations will reduce the possibility of shifting the risk of informed trades to clients without despoiling dealers of the possibility of requiring a compensation when facing an informed trader.
Finally, the promotion of dealer-sponsored electronic trading venues would give more controls over the terms of trading to non-dealer participants. Linking the trading platform to a dealer (or to a group of them) allows the trading venue to inherit the specialization of that dealer, and to overcome the heterogeneity of the bond market. Liquidity provision would be enhanced and not only relegated to dealers. Additionally, buy and hold institutions which have less need for immediacy can benefit from implementing a liquidity provision strategy via these platforms. Dealers would benefit from this innovation because they can decrease their inventory risk by delegating part of the liquidity provision, moreover they can profit from commissions earned for sponsoring these platforms.
Conclusions
When executing trades, dealers are able to discriminate between possibly informed and possibly uninformed initiators, and to strategically set the price to avoid the risk of adverse selection. When facing a possibly informed trader demanding immediacy, dealers offer better conditions when they can use their clients' inventory via an agency trade or a pre-arranged trade. Instead, when they face a possibly uninformed trader, they offer better condition to be the recipient of the trade: in this way they can build their inventory with lower risk.
Funding liquidity shortages are exacerbating these issues. Dealers with less capital constraints compete to capture fire-sold securities; they also persist in allocating incoming informed trades to their clients.
During the great financial crisis, dealers "lean their clients against the wind" by using their inventories to execute trades, while offering them a lower compensation for liquidity provision. Moreover, they are less focused on building safe inventories and are rather focused on their immediate profitability.
Because of regulatory constraints, the U.S. corporate bond market is in a phase of transition from being a "principal market", where dealers are the main liquidity providers, to an "agency market", where dealers are acting more and more as brokers. In this new framework, agency issues are going to be more relevant since investors are forced to entrust their orders to dealers rather than executing trades with them.
The progressive introduction of electronic trading is unlikely to mitigate these issues: first, dealers are not sharing the advantages of this innovation with other market participants; second, this new technology is not penetrating the illiquid and the speculative segments of corporate bond market, which are the most prone to adverse selection.
To overcome these issues, a new system of regulation is needed. These new rules should aim towards improving market participation and liquidity provision by non-dealer participants. Regulation focused on increased market transparency are not suitable for a fragmented and bargaining-driven market.
A Cleaning the TRACE dataset
A large number of trades reported in TRACE are errors and corrections, in addition inter-dealer transactions are reported twice (one by the buyer and one by the seller). To clean the dataset I use as a starting point the procedure suggested in Dick-Nielsen, (2009) and Dick-Nielsen, (2013) . In this appendix, I summarize the additional assumption I use and the outcome of the cleaning procedure.
The starting point is the enhanced version of TRACE dataset distributed by WRDS. Table 12 reports the number of trades of the original dataset (spanning the period going from October 1 st , 2004 to December 31 st , 2012) and those remaining after each step of the cleaning procedure. The steps recommended in Dick-Nielsen, (2009) are: the deletion of trades missing the security identifier (CUSIP), the deletion of cancelled trades, the deletion of trades rectified on the same day, and the deletion of trades amended later than the execution date (reversals). To make data suitable for my analysis, I also delete trades that do not occurr in the secondary market (e.g. takedown transactions), trades executed at "special" price, and trades missing price or quantity. After this first step, I separate customer transactions from inter-dealer transactions. On the latter group, I match the buy side to the sell side by comparing CUSIP, execution date, price, and quantity. The great majority of inter-dealer transactions are matched, only 1 million trades remains without their counterparty and therefore they are excluded.
The last step of the construction of the dataset is the matching with bond information obtained from Thomson-Reuters. Information are not available for some bonds which are excluded from the sample, leaving around 62,5 millions trades available for the analysis.
To assess the quality of the cleaning procedure, I compare the fraction of trades discarded with the benchmark reported in the papers cited before. Deletion ratio after the first recommended steps is 5,1%, which is not distant from the deletion ratio of 7% reported in Dick-Nielsen, (2009) . Deletion ratio after the matching of inter-dealer transactions is 33,5%, which is comparable to the 35% reported in Dick-Nielsen, (2013) .
Finally, I remove outliers by winsorizing the variables relating to the quantity traded and the price deviation at the quantiles 0.05% and 99.95%.
B Construction of the VPIN metric
The VPIN metric (Easley, López de Prado, et al., 2012) is an extension of the PIN model proposed by Easley, Hvidkjaer, et al., (2002) which does not require numerical estimation of unobservable parameters. This metric is computed via a volume-synchronized approach which takes into account the irregular trading frequency and the different information content of trades. In addition, the metric is estimated in closed form which is very convenient for larger data sets. The first step of the construction of the VPIN metric is the grouping of trades in volume buckets of equal size V . In this analysis, the bucket size V i is chosen to be one tenth (1/10) of the average daily customer-to-dealer trading volume of each security i. A volume bucket is therefore a collection of trades of the security i having total volume equal to V i . In case the last trade makes the size of the bucket greater than V i , the excess size is allocated to the next bucket.
The second step is the distinction between buy volume and sell volume. In this application, no additional effort is required to sign the volume since the initiator is known. This approach identify the overall volume V i as a signal for new information and the signed volume as the positive or negative content of this information.
The last step is the actual calculation of the VPIN metric. For each time period τ , the expected trade imbalance E[|V B τ − V S τ |] ≈ αµ which is the informed order flow times the probability of information arrival (following the notation used in the model of Easley, Hvidkjaer, et al., 2002) . The expected total number of trades is E[V B τ + V S τ ] = αµ + 2 which is the sum of both informed and non-informed trades. Thanks to volume timing, we have that E[V B τ +V S τ ] = V because a volume bucket is equivalent to a period for information arrival. The expected imbalance is approximated with the average observed imbalance. Therefore, we can write the volume-synchronized probability of informed trading (VPIN) as
In this analysis, the VPIN metric is computed on a rolling window of n = 10 volume buckets. Moreover, to distinguish between buy side and sell side generated toxicity, I sign the VPIN with the same sign of the order imbalance. By means of this modification, I have a VPIN metric close to −1 when there is a high probability of an informed sell trade, and close to +1 on the opposite case. • Principal: the trade is executed on behalf of the initiator and the security is transiting from/to the inventory of the trade initiator.
Note: Standard deviation is the square root of the sample variance for each group of trades, and it is not normalized by the number of observations. Trade Volume Number of securities traded in a given transaction.
Libor-OIS Spread Difference between the Eurodollar deposit rate and the U.S. Dollar Overnight Indexed Swap rate.
VPIN
The Volume-synchronized probability of informed trading metric as described in appendix B.
Dealer is Principal Indicator variable equal to 1 if the dealer executing the trade is using his own inventory and 0 otherwise. 
Seller initiated trades
Trade size Price deviation (in bps)
Agency
Pre−arranged Proprietary
